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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
Three Pennsylvania teachers who obtained tenure 
contracts under the state’s Public School Code of 1949 brought 
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Scranton 
Board of School Directors and the City of Scranton School 
District (collectively, the “School District”), alleging that the 




States Constitution’s Contracts Clause when it applied a 
Pennsylvania law, Act No. 2017-55 (“Act 55”), to suspend 
them from employment.  Act 55 amended the Public School 
Code to authorize the suspension of tenured teachers for 
economic reasons.  According to the teachers, the Contracts 
Clause forbids their suspensions because Act 55 took effect 
after they entered into tenure contracts with the School District, 
and the change in the law allowing for their suspensions based 
on economic reasons amounted to a substantial impairment of 
their tenure contract rights.  The teachers further allege that the 
School District’s stated justification for impairing their 
contracts, a budget shortage that presented serious economic 
difficulties, does not pass muster under the Contracts Clause 
because their suspensions were not a necessary or reasonable 
way to address the School District’s financial problems. 
 
The District Court dismissed the teachers’ claim, 
reasoning that they failed to allege a plausible Contracts Clause 
violation because the School District did not substantially 
impair the teachers’ tenure contract rights.  We agree with the 
District Court’s dismissal of the teachers’ claim, but we reach 
that conclusion based on different grounds.  We hold that the 
teachers failed to state a § 1983 claim premised on the 
Contracts Clause because their complaint and its exhibits show 
that the School District’s suspension of the teachers was a 
necessary and reasonable measure to advance the School 
District’s significant and legitimate public purpose of 












The plaintiffs, Joshua Watters, Molly Popish, and 
Laurie Burdett, are teachers who brought this action to 
challenge their suspensions from employment with the City of 
Scranton School District.  The teachers’ action against the 
School District involves provisions of Pennsylvania’s Public 
School Code of 1949, 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1-101 et seq., so we 
start by describing relevant aspects of that statute. 
 
The Public School Code affords the status of 
professional employee to certified teachers who have served in 
a school district for three years.  Id. §§ 11-1101(1), 11-
1108(b)(2), 11-1121(b)(2).  That status comes with certain 
tenure protections.  For example, the Public School Code limits 
the valid causes for suspending or terminating tenured teachers 
from employment.  Id. §§ 11-1122 (providing causes for 
termination), 11-1124 (providing causes for suspension).  As 
relevant here, until recently, the Public School Code authorized 
four causes for tenured teacher suspensions.  See id. § 11-
1124(a)(1)–(4).  Those causes allow for suspensions because 
of decreases in student enrollment, id. § 11-1124(a)(1), the 
curtailment or alteration of educational programs, id. § 11-
1124(a)(2), the consolidation of schools, id. § 11-1124(a)(3), 
and the reorganization of school districts, id. § 11-1124(a)(4).  
  
On November 6, 2017, however, Act 55 took effect.  
2017 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2017-55 (H.B. 178) (West).  That 
Act amended the Public School Code to add a fifth cause for 
suspension:  “economic reasons” requiring a reduction in 




for such suspensions only if certain procedures are followed.  
For example, a school district’s board of school directors must 
approve suspensions under Act 55 “by a majority vote of all 
school directors at a public meeting.”  Id. § 11-1124(d)(1).  In 
addition, Act 55 requires the board of school directors to 
“adopt[] a resolution of intent to suspend” the teachers in the 
next fiscal year.  Id. § 11-1124(d)(2).  That resolution must 
describe, inter alia, “[t]he economic conditions of the school 
district making the proposed suspensions necessary,” id. § 11-
1124(d)(2)(i), “how those economic conditions will be 
alleviated by the proposed suspensions,” id., “[t]he impact of 
the proposed suspensions on academic programs to be offered 
to students” if the suspensions are carried out, id. § 11-
1124(d)(2)(v), and the impact on such programs “if the 
proposed suspensions are not undertaken,” id. 
 
The Public School Code also entitles tenured teachers 
to written employment contracts, and it supplies certain 
mandatory language to be used in those contracts.  Id. § 11-
1121(a)–(c).  The Code requires such contracts to include that 
they are “subject to the provisions of the ‘Public School Code 
of 1949’ and the amendments thereto.”  Id. § 11-1121(c).  
These features of the Public School Code’s tenure system — a 
delimited set of permissible causes for suspensions, Act 55’s 
addition of an “economic reasons” cause for suspension, and 
mandatory employment contracts — are the focus of the 




The teachers allege that they entered into tenure 
contracts with the School District and that those contracts took 




Code.  Appendix (“App.”) 53.  The Public School Code 
contained four permissible causes for suspension at that time.  
But on January 25, 2018 — after Act 55 amended the Code — 
the City of Scranton Board of School Directors held a special 
meeting, where it considered a “Resolution of the Intent to 
Suspend of the Scranton Board of Education.”  App. 54–55.  
Through that resolution, the Board of Education sought 
authorization for the School District’s superintendent to send 
notices of the intention to suspend twenty-eight tenured 
teachers, including the three plaintiffs here, and all seventy-one 
of the School District’s non-tenured teachers. 
 
The Board of Education, in the resolution, explained the 
financial backdrop for the proposal to suspend some tenured 
teachers.  It projected an approximately $4.5 million deficit for 
the next fiscal year, and the tenured teacher suspensions were 
expected to save $691,033.  The Board of Education also noted 
that the proposal for suspensions came after it had “undertaken 
other cost saving measures,” such as fifty layoffs of 
maintenance and clerical staff, “healthcare savings,” “vendor 
savings,” and “other savings.”  App. 66.  Those cost-saving 
measures, however, would not provide enough money for 
students to “continue to receive a full complement of academic 
programs,” and without the proposed tenured teacher 
suspensions, “deeper suspensions and program cuts [would] be 
necessary.”  App. 67.  By a unanimous vote, the Board of 
School Directors passed the resolution. 
 
On the evening that the resolution passed, the School 
District issued a press release about its passage of the 
resolution.  There, the School District expressed its belief that 
the suspensions were “necessary for the survival and 




also recounted that “the Board of Education combed the budget 
for every and all cost-saving measures short of personnel 
actions,” that “[t]he savings from this over haul [sic] of the 
budget was unfortunately not enough,” and that the 
suspensions would “avoid[] more drastic educational impacts 
in the future.”  Id.   
 
The next day, on January 26, 2018, the School District 
sent letters informing the tenured and non-tenured teachers 
subject to the resolution, including the three plaintiffs in this 
case, of the intention to suspend them from employment.  As 
to the tenured teachers, the School District’s letter informed 
them that they would be suspended at the end of August 2018 
“due to the economic reasons that require a reduction of 
professionals.”  App. 55.  In the meantime, the teachers could 
“remain on [the School District’s] call back list” in case a job 
became available.  App. 85.   
 
In May and June 2018, the School District “engaged in 
a posting and bidding process designed to benefit displaced, 
tenured teachers.”  App. 56.  Because of that process and other 
teacher resignations, the School District “was able to ‘call-
back’” some of the tenured teachers who had received 
suspension notices.  Id.  But as of June 22, 2018, the School 
District determined that seven of the twenty-eight tenured 
teachers who received suspension notices, including the three 
plaintiffs, would be suspended. 
 
Those teachers requested hearings to challenge their 
suspensions.  In July 2018, the Board of School Directors held 
evidentiary hearings on those challenges, and post-hearing 
briefs were submitted.  The Board of School Directors later 




resolution approving the intended teacher suspensions, to be 
effective on August 30, 2018.  By that time, the three plaintiff 
teachers were the only tenured teachers who remained subject 
to suspension because the other tenured teachers had found 
work outside the School District or were called back by the 
School District.  The vote on the resolution approving the three 
teachers’ suspensions initially failed, but the Board of School 
Directors reconvened on August 30, 2018 to hold another vote.  
The resolution approving the teachers’ suspensions passed 
unanimously this time.  On the same day, the School District’s 
solicitor, who served as the hearing officer during the July 
evidentiary hearings, issued “Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law.”  App. 57.  He concluded that the “proposed 
suspensions should be sustained.”  Id. 
 
The three teachers filed this action in the Pennsylvania 
Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County to contest their 
suspensions.  Their challenges included two state law claims 
under Pennsylvania’s Local Agency Law, a state law claim for 
a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Contracts 
Clause, and a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The 
federal claim alleged that when the teachers obtained tenure, 
their contracts permitted the School District to suspend them 
based only on the four causes for suspension extant in the 
Public School Code at that time.  So, the teachers asserted, the 
School District’s reliance on Act 55’s later-added “economic 
reasons” cause for suspension contravened their reasonable 
expectations about the permissible causes for suspension and 
thereby substantially impaired their tenure contract rights, in 
violation of the Contracts Clause.  The teachers also claimed 
that the alleged impairment of their tenure contract rights could 




measure “was not reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose.”  App. 61. 
 
The School District removed the case to the District 
Court and successfully moved to dismiss with prejudice the 
§ 1983 claim for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court, in dismissing the 
federal claim, reasoned that although § 1983 confers a private 
right of action for Contracts Clause claims, the teachers failed 
to allege a Contracts Clause violation because the teachers’ 
tenure contracts were not substantially impaired.  It explained 
that the teachers’ contracts, by their terms, were subject to the 
Public School Code of 1949 and its amendments, so their 
contracts authorized the School District to rely on the 
“economic reasons” cause for suspension in Act 55, an 
amendment to the Public School Code.  The District Court thus 
did not reach the alternative grounds that the parties had 
briefed:  whether the teachers’ suspensions could withstand 
scrutiny under the Contracts Clause because they were 
necessary and reasonable means to advance a significant and 
legitimate public purpose.  The court also declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the teachers’ remaining state 
law claims.  The teachers timely appealed, challenging only the 




The District Court had jurisdiction over the teachers’ 
federal claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s 
grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, Fischbein v. Olson Rsch. Grp., Inc., 959 F.3d 559, 561 




supported by the record,” Owner Operator Indep. Drivers 
Ass’n v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 934 F.3d 283, 294 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2019) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 959 
(2020).   
 
When reviewing a district court’s order on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, we accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the plaintiff, and assess whether the complaint and the exhibits 
attached to it “contain enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian 
Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018) (quotation 
marks omitted).  The facial plausibility standard requires 
sufficient factual content in the complaint to “allow[] [us] to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 





 “The Contracts Clause restricts the power of States to 
disrupt contractual arrangements.”  Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 
1815, 1821 (2018).  That Clause directs that “[n]o State shall 
. . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  Even though “the language of the 
Contract[s] Clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be 
accommodated to the inherent police power of the State to 
safeguard the vital interests of its people.”  Energy Rsrvs. Grp., 
Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) 
(quotation marks omitted).  So, to determine when a state law 
affecting pre-existing contracts “crosses the constitutional 
line,” we analyze “whether the state law has operated as a 




138 S. Ct. at 1821–22 (quotation marks omitted).  If so, our 
“inquiry turns to the means and ends of the legislation,” and 
we evaluate whether the state law has “a significant and 
legitimate public purpose,” as well as whether the law “is 
drawn in an appropriate and reasonable way to advance” that 
purpose.  Id. at 1822 (quotation marks omitted).  
 
The teachers allege that the School District violated 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving them of a right secured by the 
United States Constitution’s Contracts Clause when it 
suspended them pursuant to Act 55.  They frame their claim as 
a challenge to the School District’s “official legislative actions 
as-applied to” them, and they make clear that they “are not 
raising a facial constitutional challenge to Act 55.”  Teachers 
Reply Br. 1–2.  Because the teachers bring an as-applied claim, 
we must assess whether the School District’s application of Act 
55 to their “particular circumstances deprived [them] of a 
constitutional right” secured by the Contracts Clause.  Tineo v. 
Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
We decline to decide some of the issues presented by 
the teachers’ claim.  The parties debate whether § 1983 
supplies a private right of action for Contracts Clause 
violations and whether the School District’s reliance on Act 
55’s “economic reasons” cause for suspension amounted to a 
substantial impairment of the teachers’ tenure contract rights, 
given that Act 55 added that new cause after the teachers 
entered into their contracts.1  We will assume for purposes of 
 
1  At oral argument, we asked counsel to file supplemental 





this appeal that § 1983 confers a private right of action 
premised on the type of Contracts Clause claim that the 
teachers bring2 and that the School District’s application of Act 
 
allegation that the Public School Code was amended and 
applied to them after they had achieved tenure because it 
appeared, on the face of the complaint, that at least one of the 
teachers had not obtained tenure until after Act 55’s enactment.  
Although the School District, in its supplemental filing, raised 
some factual disputes bearing on that question, we need not 
address them because we will resolve this case on different 
grounds. 
2  The School District posits that the teachers’ § 1983 
claim fails because § 1983 does not provide a private right of 
action for Contracts Clause violations.  Our sister Courts of 
Appeals are divided on that issue.  Compare Kaminski v. 
Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 346, 347 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
the Contracts Clause is “a structural limitation placed upon the 
power of the States,” so “an alleged Contracts Clause violation 
cannot give rise to a cause of action under § 1983”), with 
Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 640 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(concluding that “recourse to § 1983 for the deprivation of 
rights secured by the Contracts Clause is limited to the discrete 
instances where a state has denied a citizen the opportunity to 
seek adjudication through the courts as to whether a 
constitutional impairment of a contract has occurred, or has 
foreclosed the imposition of an adequate remedy for an 
established impairment”), and S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa 
Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling that § 1983 
provides a private right of action premised on a Contracts 
Clause violation when “a State, or a political subdivision 





55 to the teachers substantially impaired the teachers’ tenure 
contract rights.  Further, there is no dispute that the teachers’ 
suspensions under Act 55 advanced a significant and legitimate 
public purpose by mitigating the School District’s “serious 
economic difficulties.”  School District Br. 50; see also Oral 
Arg. Tr. 17:2–15; cf. Energy Rsrvs., 459 U.S. at 411–12 
(observing that “a significant and legitimate public purpose 
behind [a] regulation” includes “the remedying of a broad and 
general social or economic problem”).  Rather than rely upon 
those bases, we reach different grounds addressed by the 
parties on appeal.  We conclude that the teachers failed to state 
a § 1983 claim premised on a Contracts Clause violation 
because the School District’s suspensions of the teachers under 
Act 55 were an “appropriate and reasonable way to advance” 
the School District’s purpose of alleviating its budget 
difficulties.  Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1822 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
When assessing the appropriateness and reasonableness 
of a state’s alleged impairment of contracts, we consider 
whether the state’s action was “necessary” and “reasonable.”  
U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); see also 
United Steel Paper & Forestry Rubber Mfg. Allied Indus. & 
Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. Gov’t of V.I., 842 F.3d 201, 211 
(3d Cir. 2016) (“Once a legitimate public purpose has been 
identified, we must then decide whether the impairment is both 
necessary and reasonable to meet the purpose advanced by the 
[state] in justification.”).  If a state impairs a contract between 
private parties, “the [s]tate is ordinarily entitled to deference in 
 
v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Schs., 876 F.3d 926, 
931–32 (7th Cir. 2017) (acknowledging the split in the Courts 




its legislative judgment.”  United Steel, 842 F.3d at 212.  But 
where, as here, a state actor is a party to the contract at issue, 
“complete deference to a legislative assessment of 
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the 
[s]tate’s self-interest is at stake.”  U.S. Tr., 431 U.S. at 26.  So 
when a state actor “is a contracting party,” its “judgment is 
subject to stricter scrutiny than when the legislation affects 
only private contracts.”  United Steel, 842 F.3d at 212 
(quotation marks omitted).  Even with that “more exacting 




We first consider whether the School District’s 
application of Act 55 to suspend the teachers was necessary.  
In determining whether an alleged “impairment was necessary, 
our task is two-fold.”  United Steel, 842 F.3d at 212.  We must 
ensure that the School District did not (1) “consider impairing 
the obligations of [its] contracts on a par with other policy 
alternatives,” or (2) “impose[] a drastic impairment when an 
evident and more moderate course would serve its purposes 
equally well.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
 
The teachers argue that their suspensions under Act 55 
were not necessary, reasoning that the School District could 
have resorted to “any one of an innumerable amount of cost 
saving measures that would not substantially impair” the 
teachers’ tenure contracts.  Teachers Reply Br. 27.  We are not 
convinced.  The teachers’ complaint illustrates that the 
suspensions were “necessary for the survival and advancement 
of the district” because the “Board of Education [had] combed 
the budget for every and all cost-saving measures short of 




“over haul [sic] of the budget was . . . not enough.”  App. 86.  
According to the complaint, then, the School District did not 
consider impairing the teachers’ contracts on a par with other 
policy alternatives, and it did not resort to that measure when a 
more moderate course would serve its purposes equally well.  
Based on the complaint and its exhibits, the School District’s 
application of Act 55 to the teachers was necessary for the 




 We turn to whether the School District’s application of 
Act 55 to the teachers was reasonable “in light of the 
surrounding circumstances.”  U.S. Tr., 431 U.S. at 31.  The 
School District contends that its actions were reasonable 
because it followed Act 55’s procedures, which reflected the 
Pennsylvania legislature’s judgment about the care that must 
be given before suspending tenured teachers from employment 
for economic reasons.  For example, the School District points 
out that it provided “detailed information regarding the 
economic reasons for the [suspensions],” “identified a number 
of proposed revenue and expenditure adjustments” besides 
tenured teacher suspensions, and gave careful consideration to 
the suspension of tenured teachers before embarking on that 
course.  School District Br. 49–50.   
 
The complaint and its exhibits indeed explain that the 
School District gave effect to the teachers’ suspensions only 
after holding a public meeting and vote on the issue, 
accounting for the economic conditions that made the teachers’ 
suspensions necessary, and considering how the proposed 
suspensions would alleviate those conditions.  The complaint 




opportunity to contest their suspensions through evidentiary 
hearings and post-hearing submissions.  The steps that the 
School District took before suspending the teachers, geared 
toward ensuring that its financial condition, in fact, justified 
those suspensions, counsel in favor of concluding that the 
School District acted reasonably in advancing its significant 
and legitimate public purpose of reducing its budget deficit. 
 
The teachers dispute that the School District acted 
reasonably for one reason.  They contend that “[w]hen the 
problem which [the state] seeks to redress significantly pre-
dates the change in state law causing the contractual 
impairment,” then a state’s substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship is not reasonable and violates the 
Contracts Clause.  Teachers Reply Br. 26.  From that legal 
premise, the teachers argue that the School District’s 
application of Act 55 to them cannot be justified as reasonable 
because the School District’s “claims of budgetary difficulties 
predate” the enactment of Act 55 in 2017 and their suspensions 
in 2018.  Id. (capitalization omitted). 
 
The legal premise of the teachers’ argument is incorrect.  
The argument presumes that for the reasonableness inquiry, we 
look to whether the problem that the School District sought to 
remedy preceded the alleged contractual impairment.  The 
relevant question, however, is different.  We consider whether 
“the problem sought to be resolved by an impairment of the 
contract existed at the time the contractual obligation was 
incurred.”  United Steel, 842 F.3d at 213 (emphasis added); see 
also U.S. Tr., 431 U.S. at 31–32 (considering whether changed 
circumstances caused a “covenant to have a substantially 
different impact” than those impacts that were foreseen when 




The teachers’ complaint indicates that it was not until 
2018 — after the teachers had obtained tenure contracts — that 
the School District faced a substantial budget deficit, creating 
a financial crisis for it.  So it was in 2018 when the Board of 
Education concluded that reducing that deficit through tenured 
teacher suspensions would be necessary to “avoid[] more 
drastic educational impacts in the future.”  App. 86; cf. United 
Steel, 842 F.3d at 214 (reasoning that a budget “crisis” could 
not justify the Virgin Islands government’s substantial 
impairment of contracts because when the government entered 
into the contracts at issue, it “knew it was facing severe budget 
deficits and that the financial condition of the Virgin Islands 
was precarious”).  Even more, the teachers concede that, 
notwithstanding the Rule 12(b)(6) posture of this case, 
additional factual development is not necessary to evaluate 
their claim.  Yet the complaint and its exhibits do not support 
that when the School District adopted the teachers’ tenure 
contracts, it could foresee that its contractual obligations might 
create the kind of budget crisis it encountered in 2018, putting 
a strain on its ability to provide a full swath of academic 
programs to its students.  The School District’s application of 
Act 55 to the teachers was reasonable in light of the 
surrounding circumstances.3 
 
3  The teachers cite Elliott v. Board of School Trustees of 
Madison Consolidated Schools, 876 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2017), 
to support their claim that the School District’s application of 
Act 55 to them violated the Contracts Clause.  In that decision, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an 
Indiana statute, which “cut back on the rights of tenured 
teachers in layoffs,” violated the Contracts Clause when 





* * * * * 
 
We conclude, based on the complaint and its exhibits, 
that the School District’s application of Act 55 to the teachers 
was an appropriate and reasonable way to advance its 
significant and legitimate public purpose of addressing its 
budget shortfall, a determination buttressed by the limited 
deference that we must give to the School District’s judgment.  
Accordingly, the teachers’ complaint fails to state a § 1983 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing with prejudice the teachers’ § 1983 
claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
 
effect.  Id. at 928, 931, 939.  The Elliott case is inapposite 
because there, the state of Indiana failed to show, in the 
circumstances of that case, that it “need[ed] to impose [a] 
retroactive impairment of its earlier promises of job security,” 
and the “impairment” was “not reasonable” because there were 
“no changed circumstances that impose[d] unforeseen ad-
vantages or burdens on the parties.”  Id. at 938–39 (quotation 
marks omitted).  For the reasons that we have given, here, the 
School District’s application of Act 55 was necessary and 
reasonable. 
